

## IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP

# Forging a Net-Zero Future: Unlocking technological and economic innovations to bridge the implementation gap

 Thursday, 6<sup>th</sup> of March

 11:00 – 15:30 CET

 Online(Zoom)



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# Agenda

	Start Time	End Time	Agenda Item
<b>Part One</b>			<b>Transformative interventions to bridge the implementation gap</b>
↗	11:00	11:15	<b>Welcome and introduction to the event: How can we bridge the climate policy implementation gap?</b> <i>Detlef van Vuuren, PBL</i>
↗	11:15	12:00	<b>Delivering climate commitments: lessons from global and regional Scenarios + Q&amp;A</b> <i>Elena Hooijschuur, PBL</i>
↗	12:00	12:25	<b>Context factors enabling effective sectoral climate policies</b> <i>Rahel Mandaroux, PIK</i>
↗	12:25	13:00	<b>Panel Discussion: obstacles and enablers for innovation towards net-zero</b> <i>Moderated by Elmar Kriegler, PIK</i>
↗	13:00	13:30	<b>Lunch</b>
<b>Part Two</b>			<b>Leveraging carbon pricing and international trade measures to achieve rapid decarbonization</b>
↗	13:30	13:50	<b>Unveiling the topics of the Interactive Sessions</b>
↗	13:50	14:40	<b>Assessing the economic implications of EU CBAM</b> <i>Zoi Vrontisi, E3M</i> <b>Exploring the distributional consequences of carbon pricing on households</b> <i>Jan Steckel, MCC/PIK</i>
↗	14:40	14:50	<b>Report back from Interactive sessions</b>
↗	14:50	15:20	<b>Discussion: What role do market-based and financial instruments play on the pathway to net-zero?</b> <i>Moderated by Detlef van Vuuren, PBL</i>
↗	15:20	15:30	<b>Closing remarks</b>



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
Detlef van Vuuren / Isabela Tagomori

Supporting  
international  
climate policy




# Stocktake... 2025

- In 2024, temperature was above 1.5 deg C (and temperature has been increasing rapidly in last few years)
- Climate impacts visible... and science shows that impacts become worse at higher levels
- Strong common interest in mitigating climate change
- Still large gap between current policies and pathways to 1.5 or well below 2 deg C.
- Emissions in 2024 increased....



# ELEVATE's Objective

To develop transformative *new scientific insights* to support the *preparations of NDCs and national climate policies* focused on achieving *net-zero emissions mid-century in line with the Paris Agreement*



# ELEVATE's Objective


**To develop transformative *new scientific insights* to support the preparations of NDCs and national climate policies focused on achieving net-zero emissions mid-century in line with the Paris Agreement**

1. interaction between researchers and stakeholders
2. Evaluation of policies and NDCs
3. enhance understanding of the technological & behavioural options in different sectors
4. identify options to increase the effectiveness of international climate governance and policy;
5. represent justice and sustainability in climate mitigation pathways;
6. develop a new national and global mitigation scenarios (focus on enabling factors);
7. increase worldwide capacity for scientific support

NDCs evaluation  
Current polices  
Good practices

Entry points for policies  
Barriers per country  
group

2 net zero reports  
2x Bonn, 1-2 COPs



Article 6 analysis  
Governance of  
climate intervention

JustMIP  
Sustainability  
Analysis

# Annual net-zero reports



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European Union



## 2025

Low, S., Brutschin, E., Baum, C.M., Sovacool, B.K. (2025) Expert perspectives on incorporating justice considerations into integrated assessment modelling. *Nature Climate Action*. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44148-025-00218-5>

Peiz, S., Ganti, G., Pachauri, S., Rogelj, J., Riahi, K. (2025) Entry points for assessing 'fair shares' in national mitigation contributions. *Environ. Res. Lett.* <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ada45f>

## 2024

Baum, C.M., Fritz, L., Low, S. & Sovacool, B.K. (2024) Like diamonds in the sky? Public perceptions, governance, and information framing of solar geoengineering activities in Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States. *Environmental Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2023.2301262>

Calcaterra, M., Aieluia Reis, Fragkos, P., Briera, J., de Boer, H.S., Egli, F., Emmerling, J., Iyer, G., Mittal, S., Polzin, F.H.J., Sanders, M.W.J.L., Schmidt, T.S., Serebriakova, A., Steffen, B., van de Ven, D.J., van Vuuren, D.P., Waldreich, P., and Tavoni, M. (2024) Reducing the cost of capital to finance the energy transition in developing countries. *Nature Energy*. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-024-01606-7>

Misbach, L., Steckel, J.C., Vogt-Schilb, A. (2024) Cash transfers in the context of carbon pricing reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean. *World Development*, 173. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106406>

Nascimento, L., Godinho, C., Kuramochi, T., Moiso, M., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N. (2024) Climate policy in 2023. *Nat Rev Earth Environ*. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-024-00541-1> (The publication can be accessed [here](#))

Tavoni, M., Andreoni, P., Calcaterra, M., Calliari, E., Deubell-Hwang, T., Mechler, R., Hochrainer-Stigler, S., Wenz, L. (2024) Economic quantification of Loss and Damage funding needs. *Nat Rev Earth Environ*, 5(411-413). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-024-00565-7>

## 2023


Aieluia, L. & Tavoni, M. (2023) Glasgow to Paris - The impact of the Glasgow commitments for the Paris climate agreement. *iScience*, 26(2). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2023.105923>

Manjch, N., Müller-Hansen, F., & Steckel, J.C. (2023). The political economy of coal across 12 countries: Analysing qualitative interviews with topic models. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 101. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103137>

Nascimento, L. & Höhne, N. (2023) Expanding climate policy adoption improves national mitigation efforts. *npj Clim. Action*, 2(12). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44148-023-00043-8>

Nascimento, L., den Elzen, M., Kuramochi, T., Woollands, S., Dafnomilis, I., Moiso, M., Roelofsma, M., Forsell, N., & Araujo Gutiérrez, Z. (2023) Comparing the Sequence of Climate Change Mitigation Targets and Policies in Major Emitting Economies. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2023.2255151>

Ordóñez, J. A., Jakob, M., Steckel, J. C., & Ward, H. (2023). India's just energy






# Major challenges in international climate policy

- Complicated negotiations at the COP, related to justice, ambition and rate of mitigation... and finance
- New government in the USA will withdraw from UNFCCC/Paris and also withdraw the NDC
- Increasing geopolitical tensions / trade restrictions might have important consequences for climate policy
- Yet, climate problem accelerating... and it is still in the joint interest of everybody (economically) to stay as close to 1.5 deg C as possible.

# Agenda



- Current policy scenarios
- Context factors that enable sectoral climate policies
- International governance: CBAM, Carbon pricing policies
- What can market instruments help?

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
# **ELEVATE - ENABLING AND LEVERAGING CLIMATE ACTION TOWARDS NET ZERO EMISSIONS**

## **Delivering Climate Commitments: Lessons from Global and Regional Scenarios**


Elena Hooijschuur

ELEVATE 4th International workshop – March 6th 2025


# Implementation gaps are still significant



# Ambition by 2050: between 1.5 and 2 °C



# Ambition by 2050: between 1.5 and 2 °C




## ELEVATOR Pitch: Uncertainty of Net-Zero Emissions Formulations

- Delayed action
- Emission scope (especially CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O)
- Conversion metrics
- Negative emissions




# Primary energy use




- Model**
- AIM/Hub-Global 2.4
  - COFFEE 1.5
  - GCAM-CGS
  - GEM-E3\_V2023
  - IMAGE 3.4
  - MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 2.0
  - POLES
  - REMIND 3.3
  - WITCH 5.0







- **Brazil's AFOLU sector** transitions from largest emitter by 2020 to main mitigator by 2050 across scenarios




- For **China** to reach its targets, scenarios show a critical role of **CCS technologies** in the energy sector by 2060.




- **Japan's electricity sector** shows largest emission reductions in the 2°C scenario - the 1.5°C scenario depends on higher electrification combined with CCS and DACs.



- **India's LTS scenario** shows a significant increase in demand for clean energy by 2070 and a phasedown of coal and natural gas






- **Poland's use of coal for heating** is significantly reduced across scenarios by both increased use of biomass and natural gas, and reduced demand






- Next to renewable and clean energy technologies, **Saudi Arabia's LTS scenario** projects implementation of **CDR measures** to reach net-zero by 2060

# Fossil fuels in industry by 2050 (net-zero year) for EU and USA



## Europe





## USA



# African region: solid biomass use



# Solid biomass substituted by electricity in residential sector



## What do you think?

- How can these results help you in working on the transition to net-zero?
- How could results help you better?
- How is your country currently working to bridge the implementation gap?



# Thank you for your attention



Elena Hooijschuur

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[www.elevate-climate.org](http://www.elevate-climate.org)

[@ElevateClimate](#)

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# Discussion

How can these results help your country in transitioning to net-zero?  
How is your country working to bridge the implementation gap?

## Respondents:

- **Maciej Cygler**, Chief Expert, National Centre for Emissions Management (KOBiZE) Poland
- **Veena Balakrishnan**, Co-Founder, Youth Negotiator Academy (India)
- **Gabriel Kapka**, Deputy Director-General and UNFCCC National Focal Point, Sierra Leone Meteorological Agency (Sierra Leone)

**Moderator:** Isabela Schmidt Tagomori, ELEVATE researcher (PBL)

# ELEVATE - ENABLING AND LEVERAGING CLIMATE ACTION TOWARDS NET ZERO EMISSIONS


## Context factors enabling effective sectoral climate policies: A taxonomy of entry points

Rahel Mandaroux

IV ELEVATE International Stakeholder Workshop, 6 March 2025



## Context factors enabling effective sectoral climate policies: A taxonomy of entry points

 Which combinations of policy instruments and enabling factors are identified in the literature as contributing to the deployment of mitigation technologies or transitioning away from fossil fuels?

### Article search

Database: Web of Science & Scopus

Search terms: SPIDER framework

**Sample of 7,997** potentially relevant articles

### Article screening

In- and exclusion criteria

Abstract screening: manually screened 2,924

Full-paper screening: authors 207

### Data extraction of 89 articles

Coding of qualitative topics (motivation, context, entry) & measurements of policy effectiveness

Brutschin et al., (2021) classification of enablers/barrier.

### Synthesis

Entry point grouping by qualitative classification of central policy strategies.



Robustness checks by random forest predictability clustering measure.

# Terminology and definitions

**Context factors – enablers / barriers:** enablers that make the policy possible / barriers the policy addresses


**Entry:** (policy) intervention

**Entry point:** context-specific opportunity to overcome a barrier or leverage an enabler for sectoral decarbonization through a policy intervention




# Regional coverage

Frequency of research by region




Research frequency



- Cases of effective climate mitigation policies
- National and state policies
- Scarce report for East Asia and South America despite high-impact climate policies

# Sector and technology coverage



Frequency



## Legend

**RE:** Renewables General

**CCS:** Carbon Capture and Storage

**CMgt:** Carbon Management

## Assessment groups

- RE (wind, solar)
- Coal
- Transport
- Buildings
- Bioenergy
- Less studied technologies (CCS, Hydro, Grid, Nuclear)

# Sectoral policy strategies: Solar and Wind (I)

## Instrumentalists


- Rely on liberal market structure and mature financial markets for economic and regulatory instruments (RPS & certificates).

## Strategists

- Long-term policy planning using FiTs or premiums enabled by institutional capacity, interest group support and a decentralized power market.

## Regional autonomy

- Local authorities utilize their engagement e.g., by regional subsidies, grid integration, and community-based energy projects.



# Sectoral policy strategies: Solar and Wind (I)

## Planners


- Centrally planned or coordinated economies rely on top down approach with a high degree of public involvement in the energy sector.

## Adaptive pragmatism

- RE as opportunity for economic growth and additional capacity for rising energy demand rather than as substitute for fossil energy.

## Financial cross-cutters

- Refers to financial entry points providing stable, low-risk financing, such as through a national development bank.







# Mentimeter exercise



***What are the most important factors for effective climate policy in your country?***

To participate, please scan the QR code with your phone or follow the link in the chat.

# Top Enablers by Dimension



\*Geographic Dimension omitted (single enabler: Resource Availability, 20 occurrences)



# ELEVATE WEBSITE

## Context factors enabling effective sectoral climate policies

Renewables (Solar & Wind) Transitioning away from coal Zero emission vehicles

Renewables (Solar & Wind)

Transitioning away from coal

Zero emission vehicles

Green Innovators

Heavily State-Subsidized Transition

Starters and Niche-Testers

Planned economy, characterized by the world's highest absolute EV sales and a strong conventional automotive industry.

Central Policy Strategy:

Driven by energy security, pollution concerns, and economic opportunities. Policies focus on subsidies, R&D, and non-financial demand-side incentives, including exemption from license plate lotteries.

Policy examples:

- China (2009): Ten Cities, One Thousand Vehicles Project
- China (2017): New Energy Vehicle (NEV) Mandate



Work in progress

MS3: List of key sectoral entry points for analysis in WP6 (joint responsibility of WP3 and WP6)

04/2025

<https://www.elevate-climate.org/>

Economic Growth Objective



# Survey: barriers and enablers for effective climate policy

Please consider the following barriers. Which have the worst impact on ambitious \* climate policy in your country?

Please rank them all from 1-4:

1 - Very negative impact, it directly hinders ambition;

4 - Least negative impact, it has limited influence on climate ambition

	Lack of Institutional Capacity	High Economic Cost	Global Public Goods Dilemma	Competing Interests
1	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Is there another barrier that was not mentioned above and would be relevant for your country? What place would it occupy in the ranking?



Please follow the link in the chat to complete this brief survey.

Barrier	Definition
Lack of Institutional Capacity	Involves the lack of competencies, resources, and expertise of <b>governmental institutions</b> .
High Economic Cost	Implies high costs of <b>low-carbon technological</b> and behavioral change for private and public actors.
Global Public Goods Dilemma	Involves <b>free-riding</b> at the international level and lack of enforcement between vertical governance levels (communal, national, regional, and international).
Competing Interests	Implies <b>struggles between actor coalitions, interest group lobbying</b> , veto player action, lack of public support, and ideological clashes based on identity or deep-held beliefs and convictions

Adapted from Montfort, Fesenfeld, and Ingold (preprint)

# Survey: barriers and enablers for effective climate policy

Please consider these enabling factors. Which are the most promising ones for facilitating ambitious climate policies in your country?

Please rank them all from 1-4:

1 - Very promising, it directly enables climate ambition

4- Least promising, it has limited influence on climate ambition

	Public and Interest Groups Support	Low Economic Cost	International Cooperation	Strong Institutional Capacity
1	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Is there another enabling factor that was not mentioned above and would be relevant for your country? What place would it occupy in the ranking?



Please follow the link in the chat to complete this brief survey.

Enabler	Definition
Strong Institutional Capacity	Presence of competencies, resources, and expertise of <b>governmental institutions</b> . Creation of <b>stakeholder commission</b> .
Low Economic Cost	Implies <b>low costs</b> of low-carbon technological and behavioral change for private and public actors.
International Cooperation	Collaboration between countries, organizations, or individuals to <b>achieve shared goals</b> , address global challenges, and promote mutual benefits e.g., <b>JETPs, funds and technology transfers</b> .
Public and Interest Groups Support	Refers to legitimacy and trust by the <b>general public and organized interest groups</b> to support policies, decisions, or initiatives that reflect their collective interests or values.

Adapted from Montfort, Fesenfeld, and Ingold (preprint)

# Discussion

- How do the policy strategies highlighted by the researchers might reflect your own national contexts?
- In your opinion, what are the barriers and enabling factors for ambitious climate policy in your country?

## Respondents:

**Ayael Alqarni**, Senior Climate Change and Sustainability Specialist, Ministry of Energy (Saudi Arabia)

**Anindya Bhattacharya**, Executive Director, The Celestial Earth (India)

**Keigo Akimoto**, Chief Researcher, RITE Systems Analysis Group (Japan)

**Moderator:** Elmar Kriegler, Head of Research Department and ELEVATE researcher, PIK (Germany)

# Survey results:

- **Top 3 barriers:**

- 1. Competing Interests
- 2. High Economic Cost
- 3. Lack of Institutional Capacity

- **Top 3 enablers:**

- 1. Low Economic Cost;
- 2. International Cooperation;
- 3. Strong Institutional Capacity/Public and Interest Group Support

## Open discussion:

Which barrier or feasibility constraints for ambitious climate policies do you see in your country?

 Rahel Mandaroux

[rahel.mandaroux@pik-potsdam.de](mailto:rahel.mandaroux@pik-potsdam.de)

[www.elevate-climate.org](http://www.elevate-climate.org)

[@ElevateClimate](#)

## Disclaimer

Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are, however, those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.



## IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP

# Forging a Net-Zero Future: Unlocking technological and economic innovations to bridge the implementation gap

Lunch break

We will resume at 13:30 CET



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the European Union

## IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP

Forging a Net-Zero Future: Unlocking technological and economic innovations to bridge the implementation gap

### Part 2:

## Leveraging carbon pricing and international trade measures to achieve rapid decarbonization

Unveiling the topics of the interactive sessions:

- Implications of EU CBAM
- Distributional consequences of carbon pricing on households



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# Agenda

## Part Two

### Leveraging carbon pricing and international trade measures to achieve rapid decarbonization

↗	13:30	13:50	<b>Unveiling the topics of the Interactive Sessions</b>
↗	13:50	14:40	<b>Assessing the economic implications of EU CBAM</b> <i>Zoi Vrontisi, E3M</i> <b>Exploring the distributional consequences of carbon pricing on households</b> <i>Jan Steckel, MCC/PIK</i>
↗	14:40	14:50	<b>Report back from Interactive sessions</b>
↗	14:50	15:20	<b>Discussion: What role do market-based and financial instruments play on the pathway to net-zero?</b> <i>Moderated by Detlef van Vuuren, PBL</i>
↗	15:20	15:30	<b>Closing remarks</b>

# **ELEVATE - ENABLING AND LEVERAGING CLIMATE ACTION TOWARDS NET ZERO EMISSIONS**

## **Implications of CBAM and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms**

Presented by Zoi Vrontisi (E3Modelling)

Contributions: Ioannis Charalampidis, Dimitris Fragkiadakis, Paola Rocchi, Edoardo Campo Lobat, Alice Di Bella, Valentina Bosetti, Régis Rathmann and Roberto Schaeffer

# International trade measures and carbon clubs

- **Objective:** Quantitative ex-ante macroeconomic and trade impact assessment of EU CBAM and wider carbon border adjustment schemes, with a focus on major economies.
- **Method:** Three individual model-based analyses with global computable general equilibrium models (CGE): GEM-E3-FIT, FIDELIO, PAEG
  1. Assessing the economic and trade implications of a gradual adoption of CBAM by **major global economies** (E3Modelling)
  2. Expanding carbon pricing boundaries and the **EU** CBAM: insights into **China and India** (CMCC)
  3. Environmental and economic impacts of EU CBAM and SBCE on the competitiveness of the main **Brazilian** commodities on the international market (UFRJ/COPPETEC)
- **Output:** GDP, emissions, sectorial production/exports, bilateral trade

## Sectors

Electric energy  
production



Cement



Aluminium



Fertilizers



Iron & Steel




Hydrogen

H<sub>2</sub>

- EU CBAM introduces charges for importers of eligible goods in 2026 and costs ramp up to 2034, with 2035 full phase in of CBAM
- Conceived as a replacement for free allocation within the EU ETS.
- Prevent carbon leakage by discouraging companies from relocating to countries with weaker environmental regulations.
- Protect EU companies that have invested in green technologies.
- Encourage increased climate ambition in other countries.
- Promote the implementation of carbon market policies in non-EU countries (to keep revenues within producer countries).
- Generate revenue that could be used to support climate policies in the EU or other countries
- Embodied emissions are liable according to a CBAM MRV methodology
- EU CBAM charges are based on the EU ETS carbon price
- Importers supplying goods produced under a carbon pricing regime can have those carbon costs deducted from their CBAM charge

# CBAM impact & pass through rates



# Global export shares

	Cement	Iron & Steel	Aluminium	Fertilizers
UK	0.5%	1.3%	1.0%	0.7%
Turkey	11.5%	2.2%	2.6%	0.8%
USA	1.7%	3.8%	5.1%	8.3%
Canada	4.8%	1.9%	6.9%	14.5%
China	2.4%	18.0%	13.2%	14.8%
India	0.4%	3.1%	4.1%	0.2%
Indonesia	0.4%	3.1%	4.1%	0.2%
South Korea	0.9%	6.0%	2.4%	0.7%
Japan	2.4%	6.5%	1.0%	0.2%
Australia	0.0%	0.2%	2.4%	0.3%
EU27	10.7%	8.6%	7.1%	8.4%

- **Chemical fertilizers:**

- EU27 is again the main market of destination for Turkish and UK products
- India is the main destination of Chinese and Indonesian fertilizers, accounting for approximately 17% and 15% of the respective country's total fertilizer exports.

- **Cement:** geographical proximity explains largely the pattern of trade.

- **Iron and Steel:**

- To EU : Turkey 33%, UK 65%, India 33% of total exports
- To China: Indonesia 66% of total exports
- To US: Canada 93% of total exports
- To Brazil from USA and EU27 (59%).

- **Aluminum:**

- Exports to the EU account for 64% of total Turkish exports, 72.4% of United Kingdom's total exports and 14% of total Indian exports.
- Chinese exports are relatively evenly distributed among regions with Europe receiving 6% of aluminum produced in China, and USA, India and Japan approximately 5%.

# Iron and steel bilateral trade (bl \$ 2023)

	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	India	Indonesia	Japan	Rep. of Korea	Turkey	United Kingdom	USA	EU27	Total
Australia	0	0	19	6	17	25	1	4	3	7	247	99	774
Brazil	6	0	331	1368	68	22	361	227	160	130	7120	2113	15567
Canada	17	14	0	39	30	2	3	12	3	9	8906	153	9570
China	864	2579	958	0	3750	4005	1790	7117	3552	335	1778	5453	88656
India	150	196	227	564	0	402	196	464	565	393	1263	4946	15070
Indonesia	200	24	18	18342	1648	0	34	355	447	52	164	649	27561
Japan	184	270	213	3560	1389	2256	0	4394	598	138	2155	1942	32017
Rep. of Korea	347	289	624	2703	2533	976	3354	0	1654	285	3706	4124	29580
Turkey	63	48	281	5	22	2	45	13	0	295	378	3624	10992
United Kingdom	26	89	75	92	62	9	23	35	266	0	490	4086	6318
USA	95	217	7434	391	153	12	146	160	101	254	0	1330	18724
EU27	305	1351	1311	2188	1135	508	250	617	3615	5616	8473	0	169590

# Aluminum bilateral trade (bl \$ 2023)

	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	India	Indonesia	Japan	Rep. of Korea	Turkey	United Kingdom	USA	EU27	Total
Australia	0	2	17	62	40	104	802	1147	0	2	306	118	3502
Brazil	0	0	1	2	0	0	362	1	0	0	133	308	1184
Canada	0	1	0	11	4	0	0	1	1	8	9417	300	10039
China	647	292	657	0	986	518	979	1586	258	311	894	1143	19159
India	22	104	29	222	0	48	402	816	188	53	380	810	5884
Indonesia	43	0	14	228	16	0	10	11	59	9	114	28	695
Japan	5	6	4	553	11	39	0	98	1	5	176	130	1417
Rep. of Korea	108	4	9	862	158	78	208	0	124	1	538	305	3508
Turkey	0	2	61	6	1	0	0	0	0	174	275	2441	3832
United Kingdom	7	5	6	19	34	3	11	13	15	0	112	1056	1458
USA	22	55	2073	127	51	9	243	234	66	125	0	341	7441
EU27	60	205	223	319	146	25	169	168	647	2426	1598	0	46212



# Fertilizers bilateral trade (bl \$ 2023)

	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	India	Indonesia	Japan	Rep. of Korea	Turkey	United Kingdom	USA	EU27	Total
Australia	0	1	1	1	26	10	1	0	2	2	96	0	225
Brazil	1	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	2	244
Canada	30	1873	0	670	424	274	1	97	0	1	4581	310	9508
China	362	1559	5	0	2490	297	289	248	152	15	17	152	9673
India	0	15	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	106
Indonesia	90	8	0	0	197	0	1	16	0	1	19	1	639
Japan	10	2	1	10	9	1	0	9	0	0	19	4	116
Rep. of Korea	47	0	0	3	1	33	42	0	0	0	18	8	423
Turkey	0	8	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	5	0	108	501
United Kingdom	3	43	8	18	17	0	0	1	2	0	14	234	446
USA	256	1023	2047	236	43	29	62	115	12	54	0	270	5422
EU27	47	675	90	307	82	37	20	22	196	667	224	0	13758

# Cement bilateral trade (bl \$ 2023)

	Australia	Brazil	Canada	China	India	Indonesia	Japan	Rep. of Korea	Turkey	United Kingdom	USA	EU27	Total
Australia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	441	1	444
China	25	1	1	0	5	1	10	9	1	1	95	8	578
India	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	271
Indonesia	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	129
Japan	63	0	0	2	5	0	0	26	0	0	1	5	359
Rep. of Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	24	0	106
Turkey	0	11	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	67	80	596
United Kingdom	1	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	50	66
USA	1	0	147	2	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	8	202
EU27	4	8	12	1	1	0	2	1	3	280	225	0	2823

# Additional drivers of CBAM impacts

Energy intensity r.t. EU27	Aluminum	Cement	Fertilizers	Iron and steel
China	3.37	1.64	2.39	3.22
India	3.96	1.43	2.82	12.5
Indonesia	8.29	1.46	1.26	2.7
Japan	0.7	0.94	0.91	0.78
Korea, Rep.	0.48	0.99	0.94	1.13
Australia	4.23	0.91	1.11	1.03
Turkey	0.95	0.98	1.3	1.66
United States	0.94	1.08	0.81	1.27
Canada	1.27	1.15	1.12	2.38
Brazil	8.06	0.99	0.5	2.32
United Kingdom	0.22	0.95	0.53	0.77

Carbon price in NDC implementation by GEM-E3 model	2030	2040	2050
China	5	7	8
India	19	28	41
Indonesia	3	4	4
Japan	44	48	51
Korea, Rep.	75	84	88
Australia	146	187	234
Turkey	1	2	3
United States	65	74	84
Canada	35	43	52
Brazil	20	27	36
United Kingdom	226	272	331
EU27	168	286	403

# Scenario frameworks

## Analysis with GEM-E3 CGE model

Scenario dimension	Reference	NDC+EU CBAM	NDC+G1C BAM	NDC+G2C BAM
EU climate policy	Fit-for-55 extended to net zero GHG to 2050			
Global climate policy	NDC	NDC	NDC	NDC
EU CBAM	No	EU CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956	EU CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956	EU CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956
Other CBAM	No	No	Border Carbon Adjustment schemes in <b>Group 1</b> countries: <b>Australia, USA, UK and Japan</b> , considering domestic carbon pricing schemes or implicit carbon values from emission targets	Border Carbon Adjustment schemes in <b>Group 1 plus</b> Group2 countries: <b>Canada, China and India</b> , considering domestic carbon pricing schemes or implicit carbon values from emission targets
Sectors under CBAM	No	cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen, and electricity		

## Analysis with FIDELIO CGE model




Scenario	Policy implemented
Baseline	Full EU ETS (it includes EU ETS allowances phasing out for EITE sectors).
CBAM	Full EU ETS and EU CBAM (the sectors covered in the CBAM scenario are iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, and cement).
Chinese ETS	Full EU ETS and Chinese ETS on CBAM industries (the Chinese ETS on the power sector becomes more stringent, with a higher carbon price up to 40 EUR per tonne of CO <sub>2</sub> ).
Chinese ETS + CBAM	Full EU ETS, Chinese ETS and CBAM.
Indian ETS	Full EU ETS and Indian ETS on CBAM and power sectors (with a carbon price up to 40 EUR per tonne of CO <sub>2</sub> ).
Indian ETS + CBAM	Full EU ETS, Indian ETS and EU CBAM.
Chinese and Indian ETS	Full EU ETS, Chinese and Indian ETS.
Chinese and Indian ETS + CBAM	Full EU ETS, Chinese and Indian ETS and EU CBAM.

## Analysis with PAEG CGE model

Scenarios	Policies implemented
Baseline	Full EU ETS
CBAM	Full EU ETS and EU CBAM (sectors covered: iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, cement, crude oil, and soybeans)
Brazilian SBCE + CBAM	Full EU ETS, CBAM and Brazilian SBCE on energy-intensive industries (the SBCE will be gradual and divided into five main phases, covering industrial facilities that emit more than 25,000 tCO <sub>2</sub> eq per year). A carbon price up to 40 EUR per tonne of CO <sub>2</sub> is assumed (Rocchi et al., 2024).

# Main findings


- All model-based analysis finds limited macroeconomic impacts at the national and global level
- Yet, GDP impacts vary across countries
- Sectoral implications are substantial both for CBAM and certain non-CBAM sectors (i.e. downstream or intermediate products of CBAM goods)
- Bilateral trade flows are significantly affected by CBAM policies and their expansion




# Sectoral and Bilateral Exports | Selected Country examples




EU27




Türkiye




India




USA




EU27 - EUCBAM




Turkey - EUCBAM



India - EUCBAM




USA - EUCBAM




# Expanding ETS and CBAM coverage


CO2 and GDP variation under alternative policy scenarios, 2040



Total CO<sub>2</sub> and GDP variation in EU



Total CO<sub>2</sub> and GDP variation in Brazil



**Thank you for your attention!**





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CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH

# Distributional effects of carbon pricing

Facilitating socially just carbon pricing policies

Jan Christoph Steckel  
6 March 2025, ELEVATE Workshop



# Part I: Carbon pricing and distributional effects

Lessons learned from theory and practice


# Experiences with fossil fuel subsidy reforms and carbon pricing in the past



- Broad-based resistance, e.g. to rising energy prices
- Immediate price increases can lead to large protests that have the power to stop the reform
- Despite reform (partly) being progressive, i.e. pro-poor!


How to make carbon pricing policies acceptable?

# What determines acceptability?



Modified from Maestre-Andres et al. 2019

# What determines acceptability?



Modified from Maestre-Andres et al. 2019

# Three dimensions of distributional effects

Segment of Population	Criterion	Dimension of Distribution	Guiding questions
The Lower-Income Groups	Distributional effects	Vertical Distribution	What cost falls on the poorest members of society?
Hardship Cases	Personal effects	Horizontal Distribution	Which households face the highest additional costs? What is the cost to households which are most important to political decision makers?*
Hardly Accessible	Procedural aspects + use of revenues	Possibility of receiving transfers from government	Which households could be compensated given institutional set-up?


\*: Assumption: Additional costs matter to households and correlate with political support.

# Three dimensions of distributional effects

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# Vertical distribution: Progressive vs. regressive results



Empirical analysis based on World Bank Global Consumption Database, covering 87 countries

**Key result:** Carbon pricing more progressive in poorer countries  
**Key mechanism:** Differences in energy expenditures drive results




# Three dimensions of distributional effects

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# Who is affected by carbon pricing depends on country specifics


Comparison between vertical differences (in blue/red) and horizontal spread for first expenditure quintile in selected countries.




- Vertical differences (in red/blue) between poorest and richest households miss a large part of the heterogeneity.
- Whether specific households are affected depends on their specific consumption patterns, e.g. do they own a car? How do they heat? Where do they live? etc. ...

Source: Missbach & Steckel (forthcoming)

# Who is affected by carbon pricing depends on country specifics



Cluster C: Mexico ( $R^2=0.31$ )



- › Large differences within poorer and richer households
- › Factors beyond income matter

Source: Missbach & Steckel (2024)

# The Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator (CPIC)



**giz** Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator **CPIC** Methodology About this tool

## Facilitating socially responsible carbon pricing policies: the Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator (CPIC)

Choose your country ▾

C O<sub>2</sub> Start analysis

\$ \$ \$

80+ countries



POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH




# Three dimensions of distributional effects

Segment of Population	Criterion	Dimension of Distribution	Guiding questions
The Lower-Income Groups	Distributional effects	Vertical Distribution	What cost falls on the poorest members of society?
Hardship Cases	Personal effects	Horizontal Distribution	Which households face the highest additional costs? What is the cost to households which are most important to political decision makers?*
Hardly Accessible	Procedural aspects + use of revenues	Possibility of receiving transfers from government	Which households could be compensated given institutional set-up?

\*: Assumption: Additional costs matter to households and correlate with political support.

# How governments use revenues



Klenert et al. (2018)

# Social acceptance of revenue recycling

Mildenberger et al. (2022)

**Table 1 | Average estimated and true rebate sizes for sample, by province**


Province	Average perceived rebate (CDN\$)	True average rebate (CDN\$)
Received federal rebate		
Saskatchewan	268 (13)	444
Ontario	149 (11)	217
Did not receive federal rebate		
British Columbia	63 (9)	0
Alberta	83 (9)	0
Québec	54 (10)	0

Standard errors in parentheses. See Methods for details on calculating true average rebate.

- › People are often not well-informed regarding the transfers they receive
- › Subjective evaluation closely linked to political orientation (e.g. Douenne and Fabre 2022)

# Using revenues to compensate households?

- › Research finds that revenue recycling makes carbon pricing schemes generally more acceptable
- › But: There are differences how acceptable various recycling schemes are for citizens
- › Often uniform cash transfers are less acceptable than green spending




Source: Mohammadzadeh Valencia et al. (2024)



# LMICs particularities: The role of biomass and air pollution


- › Carbon pricing will lead to a reduction in fuel consumption
  - › But, what's the alternative?
- › Households may increase use of traditional biomass in response to higher fossil fuel prices
  - › Adverse impacts on health through indoor air pollution
- › In addition: potential shifts in diets; negative effects on calorie and nutrient intake (e.g. in Uganda)
- › Transfers to protect from negative impacts are pivotally important



Source: Rose et al. 2022, Aggarwal et al. in press


# Using revenues to compensate households?

- › Research finds that revenue recycling makes carbon pricing schemes generally more acceptable
- › But not all of the most affected households have access to existing transfer programmes
- › Need to expand coverage of existing transfer programmes or to design novel compensation mechanisms that target those that need to be targeted
- › Successful implementation of revenue recycling requires careful consideration of local institutional limitations and pre-existing social assistance structures



Source: Missbach et al., 2024

# What determines acceptability?



Modified from Maestre-Andres et al. 2019

## IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP

**Please select a breakout room:**

**Room 1: Implications of EU CBAM and carbon border adjustment mechanisms**

**Room 2: Distributional consequences of carbon pricing on households**



**Funded by  
the European Union**

## IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP


# Forging a Net-Zero Future: Unlocking technological and economic innovations to bridge the implementation gap

Break-out room: Implications of EU CBAM and other  
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms



Funded by  
the European Union

# Mentimeter Exercise on CBAM



To participate, please scan the QR code or follow the link in the chat

# **ELEVATE - ENABLING AND LEVERAGING CLIMATE ACTION TOWARDS NET ZERO EMISSIONS**

**Assessing economic and trade implications of gradual introduction of CBAM in major economies**

Ioannis Charalampidis, Dimitris Fragkiadakis, Zoi Vrontisi (E3Modelling)

# GEM-E3 model

---

- The GEM-E3 model is a **large scale sophisticated economic model** designed to evaluate the **effects of external shocks** on the economy.
- The model has been employed in the last 30 years by **international institutions (OECD, World Bank, European Commission, NGFS, IPCC), national governments** and the **private sector** for the assessment of transition and physical climate risks.
- It is frequently **peer-reviewed** and its results are published in top ranked scientific journals and included in latest **IPCC reports**.
- It is an applied global CGE model that provides a robust framework to capture the **complex energy-economy-climate interactions**
- The model provides results with **yearly frequency up to 2030 and 5-year time steps until 2050/2100**.
- The model features a high sectoral, regional and policy detail: **68 economic activities** per country (incl. *all* sectors assessed in the *2022 Climate Risk Stress Test*), **46 countries/regions** with all major economies and the EU27 MS with NUTS2 representation and all **GHG emissions**.

## Topics of impact analysis

- ✓ Climate transition and physical risk analysis
- ✓ Energy, climate and transport policies
- ✓ Costs of climate change and adaptation
- ✓ Trade policies
- ✓ Circular industrial restructuring
- ✓ Value chain and fuel price shocks
- ✓ Investment and innovation strategies



# GEM-E3 model overview



46 model regions:

- G20 countries
- EU27 Member States
- Global coverage

**Interlinked via bilateral trade**



68 economic activities:

- key economic sectors
- energy intensive industries
  - fuels and energy
- clean energy technologies

**Interlinked via value chains**




4 economic agents:

- Households
- Firms
- Government
- International sector

**Interlinked via institutional transfers**

GEM-E3 model

# GEM-E3-FIT Economy- Environment-Energy nexus



## Economy

- 48 economic activities
- 46 countries/regions plus NUTS2 regional representation
- 10 Households per country
- 5 occupations per country
- Consistent sectoral projections via:
  - Linking all economic activities and countries with bilateral trade
  - Inter-dependencies across the value chain
  - Detailed budget accounting for Firms, Households, Government



## Energy

- 10 fuels
- 12 power generation technologies
- Physical and monetary representation of all energy flows
- Explicit representation of energy mix in the production process of firms
- Representation of major energy policies (RES deployment, energy efficiency directive etc.)



## Environment



- Explicit representation of all GHG emissions (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, HFC, PFC, SF<sub>6</sub>)
- Bottom-up representation of key abatement options of GHG emissions
- Carbon pricing
- CO<sub>2</sub> budgets and association with temperature impacts
- Explicit representation of Climate Policies (NDCs, Carbon Neutrality policies, Carbon clubs, CO<sub>2</sub> standards)

# Scenario design

	Reference	NDC+EU CBAM	NDC+G1CBAM	NDC+G2CBAM
<b>EU climate policy</b>	Fit-for-55 extended to net zero GHG to 2050			
<b>Global climate policy</b>	NDC	NDC	NDC	NDC
<b>EU CBAM</b>	No	EU CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956	EU CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956	EU CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956
<b>Other CBAM</b>	No	No	Border Carbon Adjustment schemes in Group 1 countries: Australia, USA, UK and Japan, considering domestic carbon pricing schemes or implicit carbon values from emission targets	Border Carbon Adjustment schemes in Group 1 plus Group2 countries: Canada, China and India, considering domestic carbon pricing schemes or implicit carbon values from emission targets
<b>Sectors under CBAM</b>	No	cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, hydrogen, and electricity		



# GHG Emissions implications

- The CBAM implementation has limited impact on emissions
- Under the CBAMG2 scenario where most of the top economies introduce a CBAM global emissions fall by approximately 0.6%
- The effects are more pronounced in India where emissions in all scenarios fall by more than 1.5% in 2050



# GDP impacts

- Small global and country-level GDP impacts
- Turkey, EU and India with highest GDP losses among countries examined
- Trade (imports/exports) is affected the most in relative terms, driving GDP impacts in the EU27, Japan and S. Korea
- Changes in consumption are also key
  - induced economic effect of lower incomes,
  - Increased prices of composite goods both for countries imposing CBAM and for countries that import their goods
- Imports fall in most countries



# Exports impacts





	2030	2050	Cumulative	
<b>EUCBAM</b>	China	0.00%	0.02%	0.01%
	India	-0.26%	-0.32%	-0.31%
	Indonesia	-0.01%	0.00%	0.00%
	Japan	0.02%	0.07%	0.05%
	Korea, Rep.	0.02%	0.03%	0.02%
	Australia	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Turkey	-0.11%	-0.37%	-0.26%
	United States	0.01%	0.03%	0.02%
	Canada	0.02%	0.05%	0.04%
	Brazil	-0.02%	-0.04%	-0.04%
	United Kingdom	0.04%	0.11%	0.08%
	EU27	-0.38%	-0.89%	-0.66%

	2030	2050	Cumulative	
<b>CBAMG1</b>	China	0.00%	-0.01%	-0.01%
	India	-0.26%	-0.37%	-0.36%
	Indonesia	-0.01%	-0.06%	-0.06%
	Japan	0.02%	0.02%	0.01%
	Korea, Rep.	0.02%	0.04%	0.03%
	Australia	0.00%	-0.22%	-0.16%
	Turkey	-0.11%	-0.44%	-0.31%
	United States	0.01%	-0.05%	-0.04%
	Canada	0.02%	-0.05%	-0.04%
	Brazil	-0.02%	-0.07%	-0.06%
	United Kingdom	0.04%	-0.03%	-0.02%
	EU27	-0.38%	-0.86%	-0.63%

	2030	2050	Cumulative	
<b>CBAMG2</b>	China	0.00%	-0.02%	-0.02%
	India	-0.26%	-0.46%	-0.42%
	Indonesia	-0.01%	-0.10%	-0.08%
	Japan	0.02%	0.03%	0.01%
	Korea, Rep.	0.02%	0.04%	0.04%
	Australia	0.00%	-0.22%	-0.15%
	Turkey	-0.11%	-0.44%	-0.31%
	United States	0.01%	-0.05%	-0.04%
	Canada	0.02%	-0.08%	-0.06%
	Brazil	-0.02%	-0.07%	-0.06%
	United Kingdom	0.04%	-0.03%	-0.01%
	EU27	-0.38%	-0.86%	-0.63%



# Bilateral Exports of products s.t. CBAM | CBAMG1 scenario







- EU27
- China
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- Brazil
- ROW
- USA
- India
- S.Korea
- United Kingdom
- Canada
- Indonesia
- Turkey
- Australia

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







- EU27
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


# Sectoral Exports




# Sectoral Exports


Canada




United Kingdom



Japan



Brazil



- Primary sector
- Energy
- Manufacturing (excl. CBAM)
- CBAM products
- Transport & Services
- Total

- Primary sector
- Energy
- Manufacturing (excl. CBAM)
- CBAM products
- Transport & Services
- Total

- Primary sector
- Energy
- Manufacturing (excl. CBAM)
- CBAM products
- Transport & Services
- Total

- Primary sector
- Energy
- Manufacturing (excl. CBAM)
- CBAM products
- Transport & Services
- Total

**Thank you for your attention!**

# Expanding carbon pricing boundaries and the EU CBAM: insights into China and India

**Paola Rocchi, Edoardo Campo Lobato, Alice Di Bella, Valentina Bosetti**


Paola Rocchi\* RFF-CMCC EIEE

4th ELEVATE International Stakeholder Workshop, 6 Mar 2025

# Framework: CBAM (EP&C, 2023) and reactions

## CBAM

- Dual nature
  - Trade policy on imported commodities
  - Environmental nature
    - Based on carbon content
    - Exemption when similar domestic carbon pricing system
    - Aimed at avoiding carbon leakage
- Complement to ETS revision: gradually from 2025, simultaneously to the phasing out of the ETS free allowances



## Reactions





- Academic and institutional debate (Böhringer et al., 2022; Kolev, 2021 ; Vidovic et al., 2023; Marcu et al., 2024; Delbeke et al., 2021; Clora et al., 2023; Sun et al., 2023)
- Reactions in the political sphere (IETA, 2024; ICAP, 2024): pushing forward progresses in carbon prices

# Aim and main results


## 1. Environmental and macroeconomic impact with the specific scope and time frame

- CBAM meets its primary objective to induce a global decrease in CO<sub>2</sub>, small increase in Eastern Europe
- Negligible macroeconomic implication, more pronounced for CBAM sectors
- Partial substitution of imports


## 2. In the international context of domestic mitigation measures, focus on China and India

LEGEND	SCENARIO NAME	BENCHMARK SCENARIO	ANALYSED SCENARIO
	<b>No national ambition</b>	EU ETS (baseline)	Benchmark + CBAM
	<b>Chinese carbon policy</b>	EU and Chinese ETS	Benchmark + CBAM
	<b>Indian carbon policy</b>	EU and Indian ETS	Benchmark + CBAM
	<b>Chinese and Indian policy</b>	EU, Chinese and Indian ETS	Benchmark + CBAM

**BILATERAL TRADE FLOWS VARIATION OF MANUFACTURING COMMODITIES**



**BILATERAL TRADE FLOWS VARIATION OF ENERGY-INTENSIVE COMMODITIES**



- CBAM impact on international trade is mitigated
- CBAM strategically connects countries' mitigation policies

---

**Thank you! Any question?**

For more details or comments: [paola.rocchi@cmcc.it](mailto:paola.rocchi@cmcc.it)





# **Environmental and economic impacts of EU CBAM and SBCE on the competitiveness of the main Brazilian commodities on the international market**

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
Roberto Schaeffer and Régis Rathmann

# OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

- 1. To measure the impacts of CBAM and the Brazilian carbon pricing policy on the country's emissions and GDP
- 2. To assess the extent to which the profitability of Brazil's commodity sectors is affected by policies to respond to the impacts of carbon pricing in terms of reducing the energy intensity of commodity transportation routes to the EU

Main exports goods are crude oil, soybeans and iron ore → China, EU countries, and USA.

CBAM requires importers of selected energy-intensive commodities to purchase emission reduction certificates.



Does the SBCE impact the competitiveness of Brazilian commodities?

# METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE

## PAEG model has been updated with the GTAP 11 database:


- PAEG (General Equilibrium Analysis Project) is an applied general equilibrium tool capable of representing a global macroeconomic multi-sectoral multi-regional model built on GTAP 11 database and designed to analyze interactions across countries and sectors.

1. The PAEG model has been updated with the GTAP 11 database, in which Brazil is a representative region
2. Scenario assumptions: i) population growth and labor productivity variables from the SSP2 database are assumed to be exogenous in the baseline; ii) EU ETS allowances are auctioned in their entirety in the electricity sector, while in the industrial sectors the free allocation of allowances is phased out according to the scheme presented in the ETS review
3. 3 different policies were modeled. Initially, the adoption of CBAM in the iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizer, cement, soybean and crude oil sectors was considered. Pricing was modeled for the same sectors under the SBCE<sup>1</sup>, assuming a carbon price of 40 euros per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>.

### Carbon pricing policies implemented by scenario

Scenarios	Policies implemented
Baseline	Full EU ETS
CBAM	Full EU ETS and EU CBAM (sectors covered: iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, cement, crude oil, and soybeans)
Brazilian SBCE + CBAM	Full EU ETS, CBAM and Brazilian SBCE on energy-intensive industries (the SBCE will be gradual and divided into five main phases, covering industrial facilities that emit more than 25,000 tCO <sub>2</sub> eq per year). A carbon price up to 40 EUR per tonne of CO <sub>2</sub> is assumed (Rocchi et al., 2024)


# CO<sub>2</sub> Impacts



In terms of the impact on emissions of the introduction of CBAM in the EU, Brazil (BR) and in total terms in all economies (TOT), particularly on energy-intensive industries, modest effects in terms of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were observed

CO<sub>2</sub> emissions variation in the CBAM scenario (Brazil, EU countries and Total)


# GDP Impacts



GDP analysis revealed insignificant impacts for Brazil, the EU and the rest of the world economy. However, given the representativeness of the primary commodity sectors in shaping Brazil's GDP,

GDP variation in the CBAM scenario (Brazil, EU countries and Total)

# Exports profitability variation



Export profitability variation in the exports of crude oil, soybean and iron ore from Brazil

The main impacts of CBAM are on the profitability associated with exports of Brazil's main commodities: crude oil, soybeans and iron ore:

- Crude oil exports, Petrobras (Brazil's national oil company) showed a strong increase in its operating margin in 2024, which would allow it to deal with the small drop in profitability compared to that of the CBAM scenario. Furthermore, the European market is not the main destination for Brazil's exports

- Soybeans and iron ore

# Conclusions

- A carbon pricing policy fulfills the role of mitigating emissions. However, the expected reduction is small, especially given the challenge associated with the effectiveness of the policy in terms of reducing emissions in sectors that are difficult to abate
- With regards to the impacts on GDP and export profitability, our results highlight that the current design of the CBAM policy has insignificant implications (impacts on GDP always less than 0.5%) for both EU and non-EU countries, becoming more relevant for the profitability of exports of the main Brazilian commodities
- CBAM and SBCE have a pronounced impact on the production and international trade of energy-intensive commodities that depend on international maritime transport. In this regard, sector-specific compensatory measures should be planned accordingly, such as border adjustments
- Our results indicate that the fear of loss of profitability associated with agricultural commodities exported from Brazil to the EU is valid
- However, the effect in terms of lost GDP is relatively small and the emissions mitigation potential may be significant

**Thanks!!!**

<https://cenergiab.coppe.ufrj.br/>






# Discussion

- To what extent, and in what ways, have countries reacted to the EU CBAM?
- Which countries would you expect would also impose a CBAM in the upcoming years?


# Part II: The Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator

The data and method behind CPIC


# Interlude: Boxplots enable the comparison of distributions



# Who is affected by carbon pricing depends on country specifics



Cluster C: Mexico ( $R^2=0.31$ )




- › Large differences within poorer and richer households
- › Factors beyond income matter

Source: Missbach & Steckel (2024)

# We compile a comprehensive dataset

- › 1.56 million households in 88 countries <sup>(1)</sup>
- › Countries account for
  - › 65% of global population
  - › 68% of global GDP and
  - › 52% of global CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions
- › MRIO-data from GTAP represents year 2017 <sup>(2)</sup>



(1) Feindt et al. (2021), Steckel et al. (2021), Vogt-Schilb et al. (2019), Missbach et al. (2023), (2) Aguiar et al. (2023)

Source: Missbach & Steckel (2024)

# Modelling the distributional incidence

- We use household data on around 74,000 households from Mexico representative of the population\*

**Four household members, Jalisco, average income, no car, cooking with LPG,...**

Total yearly expenditures: MXN 120,000

\* from Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (2020)

# Modelling the distributional incidence

- We use household data on around 74,000 households from Mexico representative of the population\*
- Households report on consumption expenditures, differentiated by consumption items

**Four household members, Jalisco, average income, no car, cooking with LPG,...**


Total yearly expenditures: MXN 120,000

Services	Transport & Cooking	Vegetables	...	
MXN 3,200	MXN 5,000	MXN 2,500	...	

\* from Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (2020)

# Modelling the distributional incidence

- We use household data on around 74,000 households from Mexico representative of the population\*
- Households report on consumption expenditures, differentiated by consumption items
- We use an multiregional Input-Output model (GTAP) to derive sector-specific embedded CO<sub>2</sub>-intensities



Four household members, Jalisco, average income, no car, cooking with LPG,...				
Total yearly expenditures: MXN 120,000				
Services	Transport & Cooking	Vegetables	...	
MXN 3,200	MXN 5,000	MXN 2,500	...	
0.5 tCO <sub>2</sub>	1.2 tCO <sub>2</sub>	0.1 tCO <sub>2</sub>		


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- Next, we derive sectoral price increases resulting from a carbon price of MXN 50/tCO<sub>2</sub>

Four household members, Jalisco, average income, no car, cooking with LPG,...				
Total yearly expenditures: MXN 120,000				
Services	Transport & Cooking	Vegetables	...	
MXN 3,200	MXN 5,000	MXN 2,500	...	
0.5 tCO <sub>2</sub>	1.2 tCO <sub>2</sub>	0.1 tCO <sub>2</sub>		
MXN 367.5	MXN 882	MXN 73.5	Σ	<b>MEX 250</b>



\* from Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (2020)

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- We use household data on around 74,000 households from Mexico representative of the population\*
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- Next, we derive sectoral price increases resulting from a carbon price of MXN 50/tCO<sub>2</sub>
- We compute the total additional overnight costs

Four household members, Jalisco, average income, no car, cooking with LPG,...				
Total yearly expenditures: MXN 120,000				
Services	Transport & Cooking	Vegetables	...	
MXN 3,200	MXN 5,000	MXN 2,500	...	
0.5 tCO <sub>2</sub>	1.2 tCO <sub>2</sub>	0.1 tCO <sub>2</sub>		
MXN 367.5	MXN 882	MXN 73.5	Σ	<b>MEX 250</b>
Share of total expenditures				<b>0.21%</b>

\* from Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (2020)

# Limitations



- › No supply-side responses, i.e. strong assumption on industries and technologies
- › No demand-side responses, i.e. strong assumption about consumer behavior
- › First-order 'over-night' effects
- › Analyses prone to data peculiarities
- › Descriptive analyses → no attribution of carbon pricing incidence to particular household characteristics
- › Limited consideration of existing and recently established policies

# The Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator (CPIC)



**giz** Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator **CPIC** Methodology About this tool

## Facilitating socially responsible carbon pricing policies: the Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator (CPIC)

Choose your country ▾

C O<sub>2</sub> Start analysis

\$ \$ \$

80+ countries



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# We simulate different carbon pricing policies and compensation options

Carbon pricing policies	Coverage
National carbon price	Nationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions
Global carbon price	Internationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions (e.g. CBAM)
National carbon price in the electricity sector	Nationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions in the electricity sector
National carbon price on liquid fuels	Nationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions from liquid fuel combustion (e.g. for transport)

Compensation options	Intended use of revenues
Equal per capita transfer (lump sum)	
Equal per household transfer (lump sum)	
Electricity price subsidy	Compensation proportional to pre-tax electricity expenditures
Exempting electricity from carbon pricing	Differentiated carbon price in electricity sector
Reducing consumption taxes (e.g. VAT)	Compensation proportional to pre-tax total household expenditures

# TOOL TOUR

Find CPIC at: [www.cpic-global.net](http://www.cpic-global.net)



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# Part III: Do the maths!

Interactive exercise using CPIC

# Interactive exercise



Please note down a few observations to share afterwards.

1. Open the tool at [www.cpic-global.net](http://www.cpic-global.net) and choose **a country** from the drop down menu
2. Take a few minutes to explore the different population characteristics available, then revert back to „**5 income groups**“ and display results as **boxplots** (*menu on the right*)
3. Next, go to **Carbon Price** and play around with the slide bar and the different pricing options
4. Change the settings to a **national carbon price of USD 50** and display **results as averages** before going to the **Compensation** tab.
5. Now, select a compensation measure and play around with the slide bar to decide how much of revenues raised should be distributed back to the population.
6. After setting **50%** and **Equal per capita transfer (lump sum)**, switch back to the **Population** tab.
7. Finally, compare the impact on households divided by **a) Urban/Rural** and **b) one other characteristic** of your choice.





Questions, comments, remarks?

# THANK YOU


Find the Carbon Pricing  
Incidence Calculator at  
[cpic-global.net](http://cpic-global.net)



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## **IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP**

**Forging a Net-Zero Future: Unlocking technological and economic innovations to bridge the implementation gap**

**Report back from Break out Rooms**

**Zoi Vrontisi, ELEVATE researcher (E3M)**

**Jan Steckel, ELEVATE researcher (MCC/PIK)**



**Funded by  
the European Union**

## What role do market-based and financial instruments play on the pathway to net-zero?

### Discussants:

**Calli Obern**, Former International Relations Specialist, Department of Energy (US)

**Demetrio Florentino de Toledo Filho**, Senior Decarbonization Analyst, Ministry of Development, Industry and trade (Brazil)

**Jacob Werksman**, Principal Advisor, DG CLIMA (EU)

**Moderator:** Detlef van Vuuren, senior researcher and ELEVATE research lead (PBL)

## IV ELEVATE INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP

# Forging a Net-Zero Future: Unlocking technological and economic innovations to bridge the implementation gap

Thank you so much for joining us!



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the European Union